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RECENT DECISIONS
Related taxpayers as defined in the statute include, among others,
husband and wife, partners, and fiduciary and beneficiary.8 9 The requirement of a determination within the statutory time and by one of the
prescribed methods must be complied withY0
Section 3801 has been widely criticized, 91 principally on the ground
that its application is too narrow. 9 2 The new amendment goes far in
remedying this objection.
Conclusion
Most of the changes made by the Technical Changes Act of 1953 are
minor, some of them affecting only one or two persons. All major revisions of the Code have been postponed until 1954. This Act, however,
does remedy several unjust provisions in the Code and is at least a step
toward a more equitable revenue law.
Edward L. Burke

RECENT DECISIONS
EVIDENCE - ADmISSiBiLITY OF WIRETAP EVIDENCE - PLEA OF FABRICATION. - People v. Feld, ....N.Y ..... , 113 N.E.2d 440 (1953). The

defendant, a police officer of the City of New York, was indicted by the
Grand Jury of Kings County, charged with the crime of perjury. He had
allegedly given false testimony before the grand jury that he had not
seen one Karp, a professed book-maker, on the 14th day of September,
receive a bribe. At the trial Karp testified on behalf of the prosecution
that the bribe had been offered and accepted on that date. His testimony
was corroborated by two of his friends, both of whom were involved in
the bribe transaction. In pursuance to a court order wire taps had been
placed on Karp's telephone connections and recordings were taken on
the day the alleged bribe took place. Oral testimony was first presented
concerning the conversations that took place and the defendant was implicated. However, the defense effectively showed that each of the
prosecution witnesses had a motive to testify falsely, namely, leniency.
The prosecution then introduced the recordings to refute the implication
of fabrication.
Wire taps pursuant to a court order are admissible in New York. N.Y.
CODE C.M. PRoc. § 813-a. The recording covered a five minute tele89

NT. REv. CODE, § 3801(a)(3).

Estate of 3. B. Well, P-H 1943 TC Mia. DEc. 1"43,207 (1943), aff'd, 145
F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 793 (1945).
91 Report of the Committee on Federal Taxation, 24 A.B.A.J. 711, 712 (1938).
92 Landman, Tax Relief from the Statute of Limitations, 5 Tax L. Rev. 547,
554 (1950), contains a history of §3801 and suggestions for possible improvements.
90
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phone conversation between Karp and one of the corroborating witnesses. The name of defendant, Feld, was spoken only once during the
conversation, and this was at the end of a forty-five second pause. The
prosecution explained the pause by the fact that the corroborating witness was, at the time, talking on two telephones, relaying Karp's information to a "higher up." The defense contended, however, that the long
pause suggested a "dub-in" of Feld's name, supporting that contention
by the fact that the mention of a police officer's name in the conversation
was necessary to substantiate the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court refused to allow the defendant to question an officer
who had heard a play-back of the recording to the trial as to whether he
had in fact heard Feld's name mentioned at that time. A wire tap expert
witness called by the defendant said that he could not say whether the
record had been duplicated or mutilated, but he was not allowed to say
why he could not tell nor was he permitted to give his opinion as to the
forty-five second pause.
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in a 3 to 2 decision affirmed
the conviction, saying the trial court erred in not allowing the above
testimony, but that such were technical errors which did not affect the
substantial rights of the defendant. 112 N.Y.S.2d 912 (1952). The Court
of Appeals affirmed in a 4 to 3 decision, in effect holding that there were
no errors at all because the pause had been accounted for by the prosecution.
The first case concerning wire tap evidence reached the United States
Supreme Court in 1928 on a conspiracy conviction in violation of the
NATIONAL PROHIBITION ACT, 41 STAT. 305 (1919), Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). A majority of the court held that the admission of such evidence, that is, "projected voices," did not violate the
unreasonable search and seizure provision of the Fourth Amendment, nor
did such evidence constitute forcing the accused to be a witness against
himself within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.
Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented. Justice Holmes' sentiments are
clearly shown where he said: 277 U.S. at 470, "We have to choose, and
for my part I think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than
that the Government should play an ignoble part." Justice Brandeis was
more vehement, 277 U.S. at 473, 474:
Subtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become
available to the Government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the Government, by means far more effective than stretching upon
the rack, to obtain disclosures in court of what is whispered in the closet.
The progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wire tapping. Ways may some day be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose
to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.
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At common law the illegality in securing evidence does not affect its
admissibility. Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East. 302, 104 Eng. Rep. 617 (K.B.
1811); Commonwealth v. Dana, 2 Metc. 329 (Mass. 1841) (alternative
holding). The Supreme Court departed from the rule in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S, 383 (1914), allowing the defendant to compel the return
of illegally obtained evidence, (Federal officers participating). In Angello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925), it was decided that evidence
illegally obtaindd might not be used. Then came the Olmstead case,
supra, where a Washington criminal statute prohibited tapping telephone
wires, but the court reverted to the common law rule that the wrongful
methods used to gain this evidence would not affect its admissibility;
that wire tapping, at least in the absence of an incidental trespass, does
not come within the "persons, houses, papers, and effects" provisions of
the Fourth Amendment. The decision has never been overruled. Thus the
defendant, in such case, is left with only a cause of action against the
officer for what would amount to a breach of the right of privacy or for
illegal seizure where the conduct is unlawful. As to the remedy against
the officer, see: People v. Gonzales, 20 Cal.2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942);
and as to the effectiveness of the remedy against the officer, People v.
Hebberd, 96 Misc. 617.162 N.Y. Supp. 80 (Sup. Ct. 1916).
To Congress remained the duty of rendering intercepted communications inadmissible in Federal Courts. Congress accordingly enacted the
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934, 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1946): "... and no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.... ." Section 605 has been held to establish a
rule of evidence where interstate and foreign messages are concerned and
establishes the rule that the prohibition in the statute against communications "to any person" applies to testimony before the courts. Nardone
v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); 308 U.S. 338 (1939), (two separate attempted convictions). Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321
(1939), extended the rule in a Federal court to intrastate messages.
United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 920 (1952), reiterated that recordings cannot furnish leads to any
of the evidence introduced. But cf. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942), where it was held that the use of a detectaphone violated
neither § 605 nor the Fourth Amendment; On Lee v. United States, 343
U.S. 747 (1952), held evidence consisting of conversation relayed by
concealed radio transmitter admissible; Goldstein v. United States, 316
U.S. 114 (1942), held the testimony of two witnesses admissible, although they had been induced to testify by being confronted with recordings of their telephone conversations, provided the defendant had not
been a party to any of the intercepted conversations. Thus it appears
that wire taps can be made by federal officers, the only restriction re-
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maining intact being the rule that "telephone" conversations cannot be
used as evidence. See Westin, The Wire Tapping Problem: An Analysis
And A Legislative Proposal,52 CoL. L. REv. 165 (1952); McCabe, Wire
Tapping, 1 LAW. GUILD REv. vol. 3, p. 4 (1941).
An unreasonable search and seizure committed by state and local officerg has been said to present no federal question, National Safe Deposit
Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 70 (1914), for the reason that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to states. It has been recently ruled that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude a
state from using evidence obtained by an illegal search and seizure in a
prosecution in a state court for a state crime, providing there is no
"police incursion into privacy." Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949);
accord, Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); People v. Sica, 112
Cal. App.2d 574, 247 P.2d 72 (1952). Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v.
Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 68 N.E.2d 854 (1946); People v. Defore, 242 N.Y.
13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). For a general review of state positions concerning the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence see Note, 150
A.L.R. 566 (1944).
History, therefore, shows us the general objections to wire tap evidence, as follows: (1) it is an unreasonable and illegal search and seizure,
(2) it is an undue burden upon the right of privacy of both the innocent
and those under suspicion, (3) it literally forces the defendant to be a
witness against himself, and (4) it allows officers of the law to break
what they are sworn to uphold, providing a rather perverted example for
citizens to follow. There are other, more practical objections to this problem of permissive wiretapping and the principal case is an example.
Scientific evidence is difficult to refute, especially in the eyes and ears of
a jury. When the problem of accepting a tender of phonograph recordings
into evidence was faced by the New Jersey courts it refused the tender,
State v. Simon, 113 N.J.L. 521, 174 AtI. 867, 872 (Sup. Ct. 1934):
One good reason may be that it [the recording] cannot be cross-examined
as to whether the whole conversation was reproduced. Such machines may
be thrown in and out of gear at the will of the operator.

The inference directed at the operator of a scientific device as to his
qualifications and integrity becomes of intense importance when any
person may be subject to a deprivation of his rights because of evidence
recorded by such device. The scientific principles related to fingerprinting
are accepted without question, State v. Huffman, 209 N.C. 10, 182 S.E.
705 (1935), as is ballistics, People v. Fiorita,339 Ill. 78, 170 N.E. 690
(1930), whereas the lie detector (polygraph) is generally excluded because there is no reasonable certainty that can follow this test. See
generally, 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 999 (3d ed. 1940). Drunkometer
tests, which require a high degree of care and depend conclusively upon
the person conducting the test, are being accepted, but the process is not
without the probability of human error. State v. Hunter, 4 N.J. Super.
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531, 68 A.2d 274 (1949). Use of the radar speedmeter in obtaining evidence against speeding motorists is criticized since the mechanics of the
device are susceptible to error because of weather conditions and location,
and that operators of the machines receive only about two hours training,
hardly enough to qualify as an expert. Note, 30 N.C.L. Rnv. 385 (1952).
Thus there are two very practical areas of objection: First, the certainty oi the evidence received; secondly, the certainty as to the qualifications of the operator, his integrity and ability.
In the principal case the authenticity of the recordings is questioned
not only on the thesis that the witnesses implicated Feld purposely, but
also that there has been dubbing; the obvious inference being that
officers of the law have been overzealous in preparation of evidence. That
officers would be capable of such acts to secure desired convictions was
an extreme which the trial court would not look into. However, police
tactics have often come under the scrutiny of the courts. From this
standpoint the recent case of Rochin v. California,342 U.S. 165 (1952),
is of interest. Here law enforcement officers surprised the defendant in
his bedroom and upon their entry he swallowed two capsules containing
narcotics. The enforcement officers, after subduing the defendant and
being unable to force him to regurgitate, took him to a hospital and got
the capsules by use of a stomach pumping process. Despite this, the
defendant was convicted. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction
unanimously on the grounds that the methods were offensive to human
dignity and hence within the purview of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justices Black and Douglas, concurred in the
ruling, reasserting their argument which had been rejected by the majority of the Court in Adamson v. California,332 U.S. 46 (1947), that
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination
applied to state as well as federal action. See also, Coplon v. United
States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C.Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952),
where the FBI monitored conversations between Miss Coplon and her
counsel.
Although the evidence in the instant case aside from the recording may
present a clear case for justified conviction, its whole truth depends upon
the veracity of the prosecution's witnesses. It may have been a complete
fabrication, Karp and Michaelson intending to implicate Feld. Both men
had been indicted and both expected leniency. The recordings were the.
major item of evidence against the defendant. Of its very nature, the
"physical" or scientific end product of this recording machine creates a
deep impression upon a jury. Where taken secretly, the recording
achieves a personal characteristic, in fact, placing the jury at the very
scene of the conversation. The normal reaction would be to believe in the
recording, or what it says, as true. The Court had this to say in Lisenba
v. California,314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941):
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The aim of the requirement of due process is... to prevent fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.... As applied to a
criminal trial, denial of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice.

Our nation is often impressed these days with the scientific gadgets
which are capable of expert testimony, yet these gadgets are operated by
man, who is susceptible to error, intellectually and morally. In all "fundamental fairness" the court of appeals should have allowed the defendant
to seek and find the answers he sought, not so much for the reason that
his attack upon the conduct of the officers is far-fetched, but that he
seeks to establish the truth, in his favor or not. In accordance with selfincriminatory and personal characteristics of such mechanically obtained
evidence as this, the defendant should have been given every opportunity
to test and refute, if possible, its veracity.
Norman H. McNeil

GIFT - COMPLETED INTER Vivos TRANSFER PASSAGE OF TITLE
PREVENTING CONVEYANCE BY WILL TO THIRD PARTY. Bolen v.

Humes, ...-Ohio App ..... , 114 N.E.2d 281 (1951). Harry Irwin, the decedent, gave to Louise Pollock a diamond ring several weeks prior to
their marriage in 1942. Miss Pollock accepted and wore this engagement
ring until the day before the marriage when, since it was too valuable to
take on their proposed wedding trip, she asked Irwin to place the ring
in his safe-deposit box. Mrs. Irwin had not worn the ring at any time
thereafter for the reason that it was too expensive to risk injury or loss
while performing menial tasks upon their farm. The ring had remained
continuously in her husband's safe-deposit box, to which he had exclusive
access. Irwin died nine years later; his will, made subsequent to his
marriage, professed to convey this same diamond ring to Doris R. Bolen,
the plaintiff here. However, the defendants, executors of Irwin's estate,
maintain that there was no effective conveyance to the plaintiff for the
reason that there had been a completed inter vivos gift of the ring to the
decedent's wife; title, therefore, was not Irwin's to bestow upon the
plaintiff. The lower court found for the defendant and the court of
appeals here affirms, holding that the inter vivos gift to the widow was
complete and irrevocable, and any subsequent provision in the defendant's will was an ineffective attempt to bequeath the ring to the plaintiff.
The present' case, in holding as'it did, followed strong and well defined
precedent on the subject of inter vivos gifts. For example, the court
relied heavily upon Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co., 132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d
917, 920 (1936) where it was held:
...to support a gift inter vivos, there must be clear and convincing proof,
first, of an intention on the part of the donor to transfer the title and right
to possession of the particular property to the donee then and there, and,
second, in pursuance of such intention, a delivery by the donor to the donee
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of the subject-matter of the gift to the extent practicable or possible considering its nature, with relinquishment of ownership, dominion, and control
over it.

In accord is In re Green's Estate, 51 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ohio App.
1942), which further pointed out that when these elements of donative
intent and delivery are present the gift becomes perfect and complete
immediately.
Therefore, the present case resolves itself into the simple question as
to whether or not a valid inter vivos gift was made. It is believed the
court was correct in finding that such transfer had been executed.
First, there is no question on the facts that the essential element of
delivery was satisfied. The ring was accepted and worn publicly for
several weeks, during which time the donee exercised complete control
over the subject matter.
The requisite of donative intent was also present. The guiding principle
in this determination is stated in Berman v. Leckner, 193 Md. 177, 66
A.2d 392, 393 (1949):
The intention of the donor, however, need not be expressed in any
particular form. It may be manifested by words or acts, or both, or may be
inferred from the relation of the parties and the facts and surrounding
circumstances of the case.

4ccord, Bowline v. Cox, 248 Ala. 55, 26 So.2d 574, 576 (1946); Copprell
v. Copprell,87 Cal. App.2d 4, 195 P.2d 868, 870 (1948).
No intent other than donation can be inferred from the facts of the
instant case. A mature man was desirous that this particular woman
would become his wife, and upon her agreement he gave her an engagement ring. This was a completed gift, subject only to the general condition that the donee remain willing to perform the marriage, the theory
being that it would be unjust enrichment for a donee to retain the fruit
of a broken promise. Schultz v. Duitz, 253 Ky. 135, 69 S.W.2d 27, 29
(1934); Gikas v. Nicholis, 96 N.H. 177, 71 A.2d 785 (1950). This condition was also fulfilled in the present case. The parties were married as
agreed, and at that time the inter vivos gift became free from all conditions. The ring was the property of the donee with no reservations
whatsoever.
Considering the possibility of subsequent revocation by the donor, we
find that the law is authoritatively established on this point. Generally,
there is no revocation possible by the donor, his heirs, or personal representatives of a completed inter vivos gift. Pattersonv. Leonard, 240 Ala.
652, 200 So. 759, 761 (1941). And certainly a gift is not revocable because the donor later considers it too generous or has a desire to allow
other heirs to share therein. Guenther v. Guenther, 244 Wis. 386, 12
N.W.2d 727 (1944).
However, revocation is allowed if undue influence is shown. Patterson
v. Leonard, supra. But a special relation exists between engaged persons,
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the male being in the dominant position, and there must be clear evidence
to overthrow the presumption that there was no undue influence. Kelso v.
Kelso, 96 N.J. Eq. 354, 124 Atl. 763 (Ct. Err. & App. 1924).
An example of the reluctance of the courts to find evidence overthrowing the presumption of no undue influence is Takach v. Radice, 140 N.J.
Eq. 308, 54 A.2d 188 (Ch. 1947). The court there held that an elderly
widow, sick and unlikely to recover, may convey a residence and an
automobile to her fiance without an inference of undue influence.
Futhermore, a completed gift to one's fiance cannot be revoked even if
there is evidence to show transfer was made without benefit of adequate
advice. Kelso v. Kelso, supra, 124 At. at 764. Similarly, the case is not
influenced by the fact that the ring was redelivered to the donor for
reasons of safety and remained there under his exclusive control. Lynch
v. La Fronte, 37 F. Supp. 499, 502 (S.D. Cal. 1941):
Where delivery of the property has once been made and possession
transferred, the gift is irrevocable, and is not affected by the fact that
the donor immediately thereafter comes into physical possession and control
of the property, without any retransfer of the ownership by the donee.

Accord, Edson v. Lucas, 40 F.2d 398, 404 (8th Cir. 1930); In re
Norman's Estate, 161 Ore. 450, 88 P.2d 977 (1939).
Once it has been established that there was a complete and irrevocable
gift made at the time of delivery, the question arises as to the effect of
the subsequent will. The answer to this query is easily understood when
we consider that title passes to the donee when the gift becomes complete.
Therefore, an inter vivos gift when complete cannot be revoked by the
property being mentioned in a will. Sanborn v. Goodhue, 28 N.H. 48
(1853). The theory behind this rule is, of course, that the testator cannot convey more than that to which he has title. If title has previously
passed by means of an inter vivos gift there then remains nothing which
can be passed in the will.
It is clear to the writer that the decision of the court in this case is
correct. When the established rules of law, as stated above, are applied
to the facts of the present case this conclusion seems inevitable. Transfer
of a traditional gift, an engagement ring, was made. Delivery was actual
and uncontested, while intent was presumed from all the circumstances,
which here offered no evidence of undue influence or possible revocation
on such grounds. Undue influence could not be shown in the face of the
dominant position of the donor, and redelivery after several weeks for
purposes of safety was no indication of revocation. Therefore, the essentials of intent and delivery being present, the gift became complete
and irrevocable. As such, title in the subject matter was not upset either
by redel-very to the donor or by the donor's mention of the same subject
matter in a subsequent will.
David N. McBride
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REAL ESTATE BROKERS - COMPENSATION - STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF LICENSE REQUIREMENT - SALE OF A GOING BusnEss AND
113
A LEASE OF THE PREMISES. - DeMetre v. Savas, ... Ohio App,.....

N.E.2d 902 (1953). The defendant owned and operated a restaurant
known as "Kate's Restaurant," located in the Public Square Building in
the city of Cleveland. The plaintiff negotiated the sale of this restuarant
to a third party on the condition that the lease of the premises, which
still had about eight years to run, could be assigned to the purchaser.
An agreement for sale was made by the defendant's attorney, unknown
to the plaintiff, in which a price of $27,000 was to be paid for the fixtures,
equipment, stock, and good-will, including the lease of the restaurant. A

special section in the agreement provided for the assignment of the lease
by a written instrument to be signed by the lessor. Plaintiff, an unlicensed
broker, brought this action to recover his commission as a "business
broker" for the sale of the going business. The trial court directed a
verdict for the defendant, and the broker appealed. He contended that
he was not selling "real estate" under the Ohio Code and therefore was
not a "real estate broker" required to have a license to recover in a court
of law. The court of appeals held that the sale of the restaurant would be
null and void without the assignment. The broker under these facts was
a "real estate broker" and within the statute barring unlicensed brokers
from maintaining actions for commission, OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. §
6373-48 (1945).
The main issue in this case, as stated by the court, 113 N.E.2d at 903,
is "... whether a business broker who sells a going business, the sale of
which is conditioned upon the transfer and assignment of a leasehold

interest in the premises, becomes subject to the Real Estate Broker's
License Law...."
In the absence of statutory control a person has just as much right to
enter into the field of brokerage as any other business. With the advent
of state statutes limiting this right the problem of statutory interpretation devolves upon the courts. They must determine when a broker's
license is needed. The Ohio statute pertinent to the instant case is a
comprehensive one that seems to include almost any transaction, "...
which does or is calculated to result in the sale, exchange, leasing or renting of any real estate." OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 6373-25 (1945).
The instant decision, based on the statute above, represents a jurisdictional split of interpretation. Whether the sale of a "going business"
is a real estate transaction so as to require the services of a licensed
broker has been previously adjudicated in four jurisdictions having
similar statutes. While they conflict in their holding they reveal a definite pattern.
The New York broker's law is strictly interpreted as shown in the
decision of Weingast v. Rialto Pastry Shop, 243 N.Y. 113, 152 N.E. 693
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(1926). This case involved the sale of a pastry shop and the transfer of
the lease along with fixtures, equipment, stock, and good will of the
business. The court said that the broker in this case was only acting to
sell the business and the lease was not an integral part of the general
sale. Recovery was allowed because this type of transaction was held not
to be within the intended scope of the act. Following this decision the
latest case held an unlicensed broker who helped obtain a going business
to manufacture bowling and billiard equipment was entitled to recover
his commission. The acts of the broker were held to be in no sense a real
estate transaction within the purview of the statute. Clagget v. American
Bowling & Billiard Corp., 48 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 1944). The main
issue of these decisions is whether or not the lease was an integral part of
the transaction. In Reed v. Watson, 244 App. Div. 522, 279 N.Y. Supp.
863 (4th Dep't 1935), obtaining the lease of a hotel was held to be a real
estate transaction under the act because the court felt the lease was more
than an Incident to obtaining a going business, thereby distinguishing it
from the rule of the Weingast case, supra.
Recovery was allowed in Washington on different grounds. The common law held a leasehold interest to be only personal property. It was
held that the legislature did not change the common law by an original
statute, Salisbury v. Alskog, 144 Wash. 88, 256 Pac. 1030 (1927), nor
in subsequent revisions which clearly manifested its intention to exclude
leaseholds from its purview. Wachob v. Griner, 35 Wash.2d 309, 212
P.2d 781 (1949); Johnson v. Rutherford, 32 Wash.2d 194, 200 P.2d
977 (1948). These cases involved the transfer of a lease as an incident to
the sale of a going business. The lease was treated as an element of personal property so a broker selling a going business would not have to be
licensed. However, one case not involving a lease denied recovery because
plaintiff was held to be an agent "negotiating" under the terms of the
statute for the sale of real estate, a going business concern. Grammer v.
Skagit V'alley Lumber Co., 162 Wash. 677, 299 Pac. 376, 379 (1931).
At one time a rule similar to that of New York was in force in California. The sale of a pool room, furniture, and lease to the premises was
not a real estate transaction under the then existing statute, and no
license was required to sue for broker's commission. Pike v. Psikogio$,
68 Cal. App. 145, 228 Pac. 722, 723 (1924). In Nittler v. Continental
Casualty Co., 94 Cal. App. 498, 271 Pac. 555, 558 (1928), the rule of
Pike v. Psihogios, supra, was nullified. The reason given was that the
legislature did not agree with this interpretation as manifesting its
intention and thus had amended the act to include interest in a leasehold.
Now CAL. Bus. & PRO. CODE ANN. § 10131 (1951). Thus in the sale of
a service station and premises the broker was barred from recovery because he had no license. The lease was considered an integral part of the
transaction since the sale had been held up a year awaiting a determination of the assignability of the lease. Following this case California
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courts have barred recovery because the transfer of the lease was a
substantial part of the transaction, Rench v. Harris,79 Cal. App.2d 125,
179 P.2d 341 (1947), and because, in the most recent instance the sale
of a milling company was a complete transaction not severable into real
and personal property, Abrams v. Guston, 110 Cal. App.2d 556, 243
P.2d 109 (1952).
The New Jersey courts followed the Nittler case, supra, in Kenney v.
Paterson.Milk & Cream Co., 110 N.J.L. 141, 164 Aft. 274 (1933).
Where one third of the value of the sale of a milk company concerned
real estate the statute was held to bar recovery. The Kenney case, supra,
cited both the Nittler case, supra, and the Weingast case, supra, adopting
the rule of the former and rejecting that of the latter. The transaction
was said to differ from the latter because it was substantially, rather than
incidentally, a transfer of real estate. The Weingast case, supra, was said
to represent the narrow view on barring recovery by unlicensed brokers
while the New Jersey statute was meant to cover a much wider scope.
In 1951 a lower court reiterated this view, commenting that the supreme
court had approved it and that the legislature had revised the law without change - thus approving the court's interpretations, Cohen v.
Scoa, 13 N.J. Super. 472, 80 A.2d 643 (App. Div. 1951).
In Kaplan v. Meranus, 136 N.J.L. 425, 56 A.2d 589 (Sup. Ct. 1948),
an unlicensed broker was allowed to recover his commission for an unconsumated sale. It was a question of fact, whether the business was to
be carried on at the same location. The broker's dealings were solely
with the going business and had no relation to its location. On these
facts the case was distinguished from the Kenney case, supra.
There is a thread of consistency running through all of these decisions
setting forth a guide for interpretation. Each is decided on whether or
not the lease is an integral, substantial, and necessary element of the
transaction, or merely incidental and severable. The magnitude of the
dependence on this guide is relative to the scope of the statute. The
New York statute being narrow in its interpreted scope leaves great
room for recovery and has little need for this guide. On the other hand,
in California, New Jersey, and Ohio, the statutes are all-inclusive. The
result is a greater need for the guide. The Washington statute, meanwhile, leaves little room for any interpretation on this issue as it allows
recovery no matter how great or little the leasehold interest.
Denial of recovery in the instant case follows the broad rule of statutory construction. The guiding principle embodied in each of these cases
is also utilized.
The court in the instant case well summed up their position, 113
N.E.2d at 900:
It is idle we think to claim a commission for affecting the sale in one
breath and in another to deny responsibility for the negotiation of the
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assignment of the lease with the consent of the lessor, without which the
sale could not have been consummated.

Thus in the majority of jurisdictions where the lease is an integral, substantial, and necessary part of the transaction the broker must be licensed
if he expects the court to aid him in recovering his commission.
Robert J. Hepter

ToRTs - NEGLIGENCE - INTERVENING CAUSE. - Wilcox Oil Co. v.
Bradberry,-.. Okla..... , 257 P.2d 1096 (1953). Plaintiff brought this
action to recover damages for the destruction by fire of a tractor and
plow. The plaintiff, a farmer, started a fire to burn off his pasture. The
fire got out of control and he left the field he was plowing and went to the
pasture with his tractor and plow. He started to plow a fire break furrow
but his plow struck the defendant's pipe line. The pipe line broke; the
tractor stalled, and both plow and tractor were drenched with oil and
destroyed before he could move them. The pipe line easement acquired
by the defendant provided that the pipe line "shall be buried to such a
depth as not to interfere with the ordinary cultivation of said land."
This stipulation had been complied with on that part of the farm which
was cultivated annually, but in the pasture the lines were either completely uncovered or in some places covered only by weeds and grass.
The defendant company appealed the trial court's verdict for the
plaintiff on the grounds that the latter's act in setting the fire was an
independent, intervening, and unrelated act which superseded the primary negligence of the company. The court in a per curiam decision
affirmed the verdict for the farmer holding that it was the company's
duty to bury the pipe line to the required depth over the entire easement
whether it was cultivated or pasture land, and that from the very words
of the lease such an injury was anticipated, hence ruling out any possibility of the claimed intervening cause.
The decision reached in this case, that the original negligent actor is
not relieved of liability where he reasonably anticipated an intervening
cause, is in line with the weight of authority on this point. Crawford v.
Woodrich Const. Co., 57 N.W.2d 648, 655 (Minn. 1953); Eads v.
Marks, 39 Cal.2d 807, 249 P.2d 257, 260-1 (1952). This rule was more
succinctly stated in Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 348 111. App. 161, 108
N.E.2d 508, 511 (1952):
The injury must be the natural and probable result of the negligence
and such as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely
to result, and an intervening act will not itself become the proximate cause
if it was itself probable and foreseeable.
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Cf. Chandler v. Dugan,41 Wyo.2d 780, 251 P.2d 580, 586 (1952).
Following the weight of authority, the court quite rightly decided the
instant case on the basis of foreseeability. However, other courts find
subtle distinctions in the question as to when does an intervening cause
excuse the original tortfeasor from liability. An analysis of very recent
cases reveals that the courts follow various rules on intervening cause,
which rules, while not at all times following a fixed pattern, nevertheless
merit consideration in deciding cases on this point.
Probably the most important and logical rule is that for an intervening
cause to excuse the original negligent conduct of the actor it must be a
superseding negligent act. 1 SHERM AN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE 101
(Zipp's Rev. ed. 1941) states that an intervening cause "... . is a superseding cause if it so entirely supersedes the operation of the defendant's
negligence that it alone, without his negligence contributing thereto in the
slightest degree, produces the injury." One court stated that no intervening act could break the chain of cause and effect of the original negligence unless the intervening negligent act was the superseding cause of
the injury. Louisville & N. Ry. v. Powers, 255 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Ky.
1952). This point on superseding cause will be seen to run throughout
most cases on intervening causation and is an excellent rule to follow in
determining the proximate cause of negligence by original actors and
intervening third parties.
Another rule that is given attention by many courts is that if the act
of the original negligent actor would not of itself have produced the
injuries to the injured party, the negligence of the actor is not the
proximate cause and he is not liable. Irwin v. GeorgiaPower & Light Co.,
84 Ga. App. 665, 67 S.E.2d 151, 154 (1951); Wallace v. Electric Power
Board, 259 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tenn. 1953). The distinction between this
rule and that of superseding cause is that in the former the plaintiff's
injuries could not have resulted solely nor primarily from the defendant's
actions whereas in the latter the negligence of the defendant alone might
have produced the injury. In the sole proximate cause rule, discussed
infra, defendant's negligent acts alone and independently would have
been the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries had not another actor
been concurrently negligent.
In regards to the original negligent actor rule the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma has held that if the original negligence furnished only a condition giving rise to a possible injury and an independent negligent act
committed subsequent to the original negligence was the real cause of
the injury, then the original negligence was not the proximate cause of
the injury. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Robertson, 207 Okla. 80, 247 P.2d
501, 503 (1952). In this case the plaintiff was injured when a wheel came
off a car that was going in the opposite direction to the plaintiff. The
instant danger of the wheel hitting his car caused the plaintiff to swerve
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into the other lane on the highway and he crashed head-on into the
defendant's truck which was unable to stop in time to avert the collision.
The broken wheel in this case was determined to be an intervening cause,
independent of the original negligent act of speeding by the defendant.
What might distinguish this case from the instant case is the fact that the
truck driver in the Phillips case, supra, did not or should not have foreseen that the car in front of him would lose a wheel, whereas the oil
company in the present case, by entering into the easement agreement,
did or should have anticipated the injury to the farmer. The distinction,
admittedly, is conjectural.
A third rule is that of "sole proximate cause." In Kisor v. Tulsa
Rendering Co., 113 F. Supp. 10, 18 (W.D. Ark. 1953), the court said
that where the defendant's act greatly enhanced the possibility of harm
from third parties then the defendant might be liable. But where the
original negligence is that of the defendant, and an intervening act of a
third person is really the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, defendant was not liable as his negligence could not be the proximate
cause of the injuries to the plaintiff. Accord, Huffman v. Sorenson, 76
S.E.2d 183, 188-9 (Va. 1953); Webb v. Sessler, 63 S.E.2d 65, 69 (W.Va.
1950). In the latter case the decedent was killed while sitting in an auto
parked next to an airport. Through the negligent and careless flying of a
third party defendant, the plane crashed into decedent's car. Holding
that the defendant's negligent repairs on the plane were not the proximate cause of death, the court said that where there exists a sole, effective
intervening cause, there can be no other proximate causes.
Closely allied to the second rule mentioned previously is the "new
and independent" cause rule. Although courts do not break down the
topic of intervening causes so minutely, this phrase has appeared occasionally. In Bryant v. Banner Dairies, 255 S.W.2d 271, 275 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1953), the plaintiff was injured when the car in which he was
riding collided with defendant's trailer, which was parked on the highway
without flares. The court said that the bright lights of an on-coming
truck blinded the plaintiff who otherwise would have seen the trailer, and
that this act was an intervention of a new and independent cause which
destroyed the causal connection between the original negligent act of the
defendant and the injury of the plaintiff. However, the court affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the "new and independent" cause was a concurring cause of the collision and the defendant was still held liable. See also
Wilson v. Edwards, 77 S.E.2d 164, 172 (W.Va. 1953).
A fifth rule, which really seems to be the superseding intervening
cause rule viewed from a different perspective is where a duty upon the
original actor has been transferred or devolved upon the intervening
third party. Shupe v. Antelope County, 59 N.W.2d 710, 716 (Neb.
1953); Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419,
422 (1953). The plaintiff in the Thrash case was injured while driving
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his father's truck when a lock ring on one of the front wheels blew off
causing the truck to crash down an embankment. The truck had
originally been sold by the defendant to a used car dealer, who in turn
sold it to the father of the plaintiff. The court held defendant liable and
stated that where a duty devolves on a third party subsequent to the
original negligent act and the third party fails to perform this duty, the
chain of causation is broken by the intervening agency of the third
party, which in this case was the used car dealer.
Where the intervening act is unrelated to the act of the defendant in
bringing about plaintiff's injury another rule is cited. In Jackson v. Jones,
61 So.2d 557, 560 (La. 1952), while playing "follow the leader," the
plaintiff was injured when she fell from a pile of lumber stacked helterskelter on the school grounds. The fall was a result of a push by a fellow
classmate. The court ruled out the attractive nuisance theory holding
that even if the act of the defendant in stacking the lumber on the
ground amounted to negligence, the efficient cause of the accident was
brought about by a distinct and separate cause wholly unrelated to the
defendant's act. This rule, while capable of separate application, is like
many of the rules in such type cases inasmuch as they may complement
the other rules cited supra, in their use throughout the cases already
mentioned.
The final rule as to when an intervening cause arises is the test of
foreseeabiity. This rule is well stated in Hines v. Westerfield, 254
S.W.2d 728, 729 (Ky. 1953):
If, however, the ultimate injury is brought about by an intervening act
or force so unusual as not to have been reasonably foreseeable, the intervening act is considered as the superseding cause and the original actor is
not liable.

Accord, Livingston v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 106 F. Supp. 886, 891
(E.D.S.C. 1952). In Ranney v. HabernRealty Corp., 281 App. Div. 278,

119 N.Y.S.2d 192, 198 (lst Dep't 1953), the plaintiff rigger was working
on top of a sidewalk storage shed, when a third party company's metal
cable on its crane broke and dropped both the rigger and the stones to
the sidewalk. The defendant had failed to procure a permit for a storagetype sidewalk shed in violation of a city ordinance. The New York court
held that the facts and the jury's finding that the bridge was not overloaded showed that it was a safe place in which to work; that the accident would not have occurred without the intervening act of the third
party; and that the intervening negligent act was not reasonably foreseeable and thus defendant was not liable for the injuries to the plaintiff.
As has been stated the court in the instant case was correct in its
decision which merely followed one of the above enumerated rules,
namely that of foreseeability, which ruled out any possibility of intervening cause. From these rules and their applications in various courts,
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it can be seen that there is no stereotyped rule defining an intervening
cause. The rules regarding foreseeability and superseding cause seem to
be the better and more generally accepted rules. Certainly a judge's instructions to a jury would be more easily understood by the panel along
the lines of foreseeability and superseding cause than those of the unrelated act or transfer of original duty rules.
John P. Coyne

TORTS -

NEGLIGENCE -

LIABILITY OF SELLER OF USED CARS. -

Thrash v. U-Drive-It Co., 158 Ohio St. 465, 110 N.E.2d 419 (1953).
This action for personal injuries was brought by the minor son of a
purchaser of a used truck against both prior owners of the truck. The
truck originally belonged to the U-Drive-It Co. which had rented the
truck to the public for some years before selling it to the used car
dealer. The U-Drive-It Co. sold the truck without warranty, "as is" to
the dealer. The dealer sold the truck to the father of the injured plaintiff. The accident occurred when a lock ring suddenly blew off the left
front wheel ultimately causing the truck to leave the road and plunge
down an embankment. The lock ring was alleged to have been defective
when the truck was in the possession of the U-Drive-It Co. The trial court
rendered judgment in favor of both defendants. On appeal the judgment
was affirmed for the U-Drive-It Co. and reversed for the used car dealer.
On this appeal the judgment of the court of appeals as to each defendant
was affirmed.
The question to be discussed is whether an owner of a used motor
vehicle who sells the vehicle to a used car dealer should be held liable
to a third party who purchases the car from the used car dealer and
subsequently is injured due to a defect in the vehicle which existed during
the original owner's possession. The court answered no in the instant case.
The rules relied on by the plaintiff in the instant case are found in the
numerous cases which limit the general rule concerning the liability of
manufacturers and sellers. The rule is found in Winterbottom v. Wright,
10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842) where the court held
that a manufacturer or seller is not liable to an injured third person who
has no contractual relation with him for negligence in the construction,
manufacture or sale of an article. One of the first cases in America to
limit the so-called "general rule", Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397
(1852), marked the beginning of the "dangerous instrumentality doctrine." There a drug dealer who had mislabeled a bottle containing
poison was held liable for injuries sustained from the poison by a third
person. The court said that there was a duty on a manufacturer or seller
of such items to protect the public.
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A further limitation of the rule in Winterbottom v. Wright, supra, was
brought out in the now famous case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). This case extended the liability
of a manufacturer to goods that were not inherently dangerous but
might become dangerous if not properly constructed. In that case the
court held a manufacturer of a new car liable to a remote vendee for
injuries caused by failure to properly inspect a wheel, bought from another manufacturer, which has a discoverable defect. In accord is General Motors Corp. v. Johnson, 137 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1943) where
the court states that the manufacturer of a new truck owes a duty to the
public to use reasonable care in its construction and to make a reasonable
inspection of such construction in the plant where it was manufactured.
It is difficult, however, to draw an analogy between a seller of a used
truck to a used car dealer without warranty and furthermore, as in the
instant case, with the specific stipulation "as is", and the manufacturer
of a new automobile furnishing cars to his dealers. A new car dealer is
generally not liable for any inherent defects of the cars he sells and
seldom, if ever, is he liable for the defects caused by the manufacturer's
negligence. The new car dealer is not expected to assume the duty placed
on a manufacturer to protect the public against defects in the new automobile. Gordon v. Bates-Crumley Chevrolet Co., 158 So. 223 (La. App.),
aff'd, 182 La. 795, 162 So. 624 (1935); accord, McLean v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 85 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 600
(1936).
A used car dealer, while not an insurer of the safety of the car he sells,
must exercise reasonable care for the safe condition of such cars. In
Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928), the
defendant was a used car dealer who sold the plaintiff a car which had
defective brakes. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by the defective brakes. The court held the used car dealer liable. It reasoned that
a used car dealer must take reasonable care to discover defects in any car
he sells. The court said that the law would show scant consideration of
human life if it did not lay this degree of care on the seller of the car for
the benefit of all who were likely to come in contact with it. In Benton v.
Sloss, 38 Cal.2d 399, 240 P.2d 575 (1952) a used car dealer was held
liable for the defects in a car he had sold, and it was stated that although
he had no duty to disassemble the car, he should have made reasonable
inspection for defects that would make the car dangerous on the highways. Accord, Egan Chevrolet Co. v. Bruner, 102 F.2d 373 (8th Cir.
1939); McLeod v. Holt Motor Co., 208 Minn. 473, 294 N.W. 479
(1940).
It can be seen from these cases that a used car dealer constitutes an
efficient intervening agency between his vendor, in this case the U-DriveIt Co., and his vendee, the plaintiff. The new car dealer on the other hand
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has no such duty to his vendee and any liability for defects falls on the
manufacturer.
In a case more analogous to the instant case, Ford Motor Co. v.
Wagoner, 183 Tenn. 392, 192 S.W.2d 840 (1940), the court considers
the situations when an intervening efficient agency will insulate the
liability of the original wrongdoer. The Ford Motor Co. had put a defective catch on the hoods of a particular style of car. After learning of
the dangerous propensities of the hood latch,,the company offered to put
a safety catch on all the cars free of charge. A salesman of one of the
manufacturer's dealers bought a car with the defective latch. The salesman refused to have the safety latch put on his car because he felt it
wasn't necessary. The salesman thereafter severed his relationship with
the dealer and started working for another dealer. At this point he sold
the car to a friend of the plaintiff without notifying him of the defective
latch. The court held the salesman to be an independent intervening
agency which insulated the liability of the manufacturer to the plaintiff.
It was held that the intervening agent would destroy the manufacturer's
liability if the action of the agent was, "(1) independent, (2) efficient,
(3) conscious and (4) not reasonably to have been anticipated." Ford
Motor Co. v. Wagoner, supra, 192 S.W.2d at 844.
Another case holding a used car dealer to be an efficient intervening
agent is McGuire v. Hartford Buick Co., 131 Conn. 417, 40 A.2d 269
(1944). A secondhand car dealer was held liable for his vendee's injuries
which were caused by faulty tire lugs on a used car. An independent
contractor had caused the defect in the car by installing faulty lugs, but
the dealer had regained possession of the car after the negligence of the
contractor. This possession, coupled with the duty of a secondhand car
dealer to use reasonable care in inspecting the cars he sells, was enough
to hold the dealer liable for his vendee's injuries. Cf. Stultz v. Benson
Lumber Co., 6 Cal.2d 688, 59 P.2d 100 (1936); Moore v. Jefferson
Distillingand DenaturingCo., 169 La. 1156, 126 So. 691 (1930).
It is submitted that the stipulation "as is" that was made by the UDrive-It Co. would relieve it of any reasonable anticipation of negligence
on the part of the used car dealer. This fact coupled with the rule holding used car dealers to be efficient agents would seem to be the "insulating factor" which would exonerate the U-Drive-It Co. from liability to
any remote vendee. The U-Drive-It Co. had no duty toward the purchaser in this case and logically the purchaser should not look to it when
buying the truck. The decision in this case seems to be sound. It does
not seem to be too harsh a rule to expect a used car dealer to exercise
reasonable care in inspecting the cars he sells. The court in this case has
placed the liability where it belongs; the used car dealer who has or
should have the facilities for inspecting the cars he sells is fixed with the
responsibility for such inspection.
Allan Schmid

